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LOVING LESSONS: WHITE SUPREMACY,
LOVING V. VIRGINIA, AND
DISPROPORTIONALITY IN THE CHILD
WELFARE SYSTEM
Leah A. Hill*
INTRODUCTION
This Article looks back at the antimiscegenation laws that were at the
center of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Loving v. Virginia1 to reveal
what they teach us about the current overrepresentation of black children in
It is widely accepted that
the American child welfare system.2
antimiscegenation laws worked to preserve white supremacy—particularly,
the superiority of white people to blacks3—but these laws also worked to
forestall the creation of interracial families.4 Moreover, laws banning
interracial marriage were said to prevent children from suffering harm caused
by race mixing.5 Thus, these laws were viewed by supporters as preventing
child abuse.6 By focusing on the harm—or “damage”7—of being biracial,
these laws foreshadowed the pervasive disproportionality in the child welfare
system today.

* Associate Dean for Experiential Education and Clinical Associate Professor, Fordham
University School of Law. I want to extend my sincere thanks to Sloane Lewis, my research
assistant. Thanks also to Robin A. Lenhardt, Kimani Paul-Emile, and Tanya K. Hernández,
as well as the editors of the Fordham Law Review, for the opportunity to reflect on the legacy
of the landmark decision in Loving v. Virginia at the Symposium entitled Fifty Years of Loving
v. Virginia and the Continued Pursuit of Racial Equality held at Fordham University School
of Law on November 2–3, 2017. For an overview of the Symposium, see R.A. Lenhardt,
Tanya K. Hernández & Kimani Paul-Emile, Foreword: Fifty Years of Loving v. Virginia and
the Continued Pursuit of Racial Equality, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2625 (2018).
1. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
2. For recent data on the overrepresentation of black children in the child welfare system,
see CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, RACIAL DISPROPORTIONALITY AND DISPARITY IN CHILD
WELFARE (2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/racial_disproportionality.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B4XW-PH38].
3. See Christopher R. Leslie, Justice Alito’s Dissent in Loving v. Virginia, 55 B.C. L.
REV. 1563, 1571 (2014); James Trosino, Note, American Wedding: Same-Sex Marriage and
the Miscegenation Analogy, 73 B.U. L. REV. 93, 99–101 (1993).
4. See Leslie, supra note 3, at 1605; Trosino, supra note 3, at 101–02.
5. See Oral Argument at 1:26:19–:26:40, Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (No. 395),
https://www.oyez.org/cases/1966/395 [https://perma.cc/9LCP-BZ8C].
6. See id.; Trosino, supra note 3, at 102.
7. Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 1:26:32–:26:40.
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While there is widespread agreement that antimiscegenation laws
reinforced white superiority over blacks, the claim that these laws were
designed to prevent child abuse is less apparent in scholarship.8 This Article
explores one argument put forth by the state of Virginia in support of its ban
on interracial marriage—that the prohibition against interracial marriage was
a valid exercise of state power to protect children from damage that would
result from intermarriage between blacks and whites.9 The state’s argument
in Loving focused on the challenges that biracial children would face while
navigating the racist context of the United States at the time.10 Underneath
Virginia’s veiled concern for the well-being of biracial children was a more
insidious claim: children of black and white unions would be harmed by
exposure to black family norms.11
The persistent overrepresentation of black children in the child welfare
system provides an opportunity to examine how racist attitudes about black
family norms continue to influence family law.12 There is already an
established body of literature pointing to the role of bias in perpetuating racial
disproportionality in the child welfare system.13 This Article argues that
child-abuse reporting laws—and particularly, mandates focused on reporting
and investigating child neglect—invite decision makers to use implicit
attitudes to evaluate black parents. In doing so, these decision makers
summon the ghosts of white supremacists’ ideas about preventing child
abuse, the very same ideas that informed arguments in support of Virginia’s
antimiscegenation laws that were struck down in Loving.
Part I of this Article introduces a brief discussion of the history of
antimiscegenation laws and, specifically, their prevalence in the
Commonwealth of Virginia during the 1950s. Next, Part II sets forth a short
commentary about the Lovings’ triumph over antimiscegenation. Part III
then details the Lovings’ judicial hurdles against the state, which argued that
its antimiscegenation laws were enacted, in part, to prevent child abuse and
thus served legitimate state interests. Part IV argues that the remnants of the
8. See Leslie, supra note 3, at 1605–07.
9. Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 1:26:19–:26:40; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-54
(1950 & Supp. 1960) (repealed 1968).
10. See Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 1:26:19–:26:40; see also id. at 1:27:03–:27:17,
1:27:54–:28:06.
11. The opinion denying the Lovings’ motion to vacate their conviction, written by Judge
Leon Bazile, had no such pretense. Loving v. Commonwealth (Va. Cir. Ct. Caroline Cty. Jan.
22, 1965). Judge Bazile opined that the legislature’s decision to enact antimiscegenation laws
was based upon “wisdom and the moral development of both races.” Id. He referred to
marriages between blacks and whites as “unnatural alliances” and ultimately declared:
Almighty God created the races white, black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed
them on separate continents. And but for the interference with his arrangement there
would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows
that he did not intend for the races to mix.
Id.; see also Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 3 (1967) (quoting Judge Bazile).
12. See generally Sonia M. Gipson Rankin, Black Kinship Circles in the 21st Century:
Survey of Recent Child Welfare Reforms and How It Impacts Black Kinship Care Families,
WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC., Spring 2013, at 1; Zanita E. Fenton, Note, In a World Not
Their Own: The Adoption of Black Children, 10 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 39 (1993).
13. See, e.g., CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 2, at 2.
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white supremacist ideology at the center of Loving appear in our modern
child welfare system, which has long been plagued by disproportionate
representation of black children and families. Finally, Part V builds on this
discussion and contends that the prevalence of racial disproportionality in the
current child welfare system is the product of front-end implicit bias, a view
supported by extensive research on decision-making and behavioral conduct.
It argues that current child welfare management and investigatory practices
allow implicit bias to sneak in at the front end of such practices, thereby
providing gateways to disproportionality.
I. WHITE SUPREMACY AND ANTIMISCEGENATION LAWS
Laws prohibiting interracial marriage in the United States date back to
colonial times, when the first of such laws banned white women from
marrying slaves.14 By the time Mildred and Richard Loving were married in
1958, more than half of the states had enacted laws prohibiting
miscegenation.15 These laws worked primarily to promote and preserve
white supremacy; particularly, the superiority of the white race when
compared to that of blacks.16 Although laws barring whites from marrying
nonwhites varied from state to state, they all had one consistent provision:
whites were prohibited from marrying blacks.17 It is not surprising that when
the Lovings were married in 1958, interracial relationships were rare,
especially between blacks and whites.18 Significantly, interracial relations
between white men and black women were almost nonexistent.19

14. See generally Byron Curti Martyn, Racism in The United States: A History of the
Anti-Miscegenation Legislation and Litigation (May 19, 1979) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Southern California) (on file with the University of Southern
California Digital Library); see also 1 ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND: PROCEEDINGS AND ACTS OF
THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND: JANUARY 1637/8—SEPTEMBER 1664, at 533
(William Hand Browne ed., 1883); Carter G. Woodson, The Beginnings of the Miscegenation
of the Whites and Blacks, 3 J. NEGRO HIST. 335, 339–40 (1918); Tom Head, Interracial
Marriage
Laws
History
&
Timeline,
THOUGHTCO.
(Feb.
23,
2018),
https://www.thoughtco.com/interracial-marriage-laws-721611
[https://perma.cc/A89AU8E5].
15. James R. Browning, Anti-Miscegenation Laws in the United States, 1 DUKE B.J. 26,
26–31 (1951); see also Trosino, supra note 3, at 98.
16. Browning, supra note 15, at 33–35; Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring:
Welfare Reform’s Marriage Cure as the Revival of Post-Bellum Control, 93 CALIF. L. REV.
1647, 1656–58 (2005) (arguing that following emancipation, states permitted and encouraged
former slaves to marry in order to maintain control over blacks on the one hand, but prohibited
interracial marriage in order to maintain white dominance in the social hierarchy on the other);
see also Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 23–25 (Cal. 1948) (rejecting the state’s justification
that its miscegenation statute “prevents the Caucasian race from being contaminated by races
whose members are by nature physically and mentally inferior to Caucasians”).
17. Browning, supra note 15, at 31.
18. Gretchen Livingston & Anna Brown, Intermarriage in the U.S. 50 Years After Loving
v. Virginia, PEW RES. CTR. (May 18, 2017), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2017/05/18/
intermarriage-in-the-u-s-50-years-after-loving-v-virginia/ [https://perma.cc/C5F5-KDND].
19. Id.
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The antimiscegenation statutes at the center of the Loving case were blunt
in condemning marriage between blacks and whites.20 The law held that any
white person who married a “colored person” and any colored person who
married a white person would be guilty of a felony punishable by up to five
years in prison.21 On the one hand, a person was defined as “white” if he had
“no trace whatever of any blood other than Caucasian.”22 On the other hand,
one was defined as a “colored person” if he had any “ascertainable . . . Negro
blood.”23 Hence, white supremacist ideals of white purity and black taint
were written into the statute.24 Any marriage in violation of Virginia’s
prohibition against interracial marriage was deemed void.25 Interracial
couples who left the state to marry were barred from returning as husband
and wife and faced arrest if they did.26
II. LOVING TRIUMPH
The Lovings’ story is one of triumph over the hate that permeated life in
the 1950s. They were married at the height of the Jim Crow era, when laws
barring interracial marriage were part of the broader legacy of legalized
racism and segregation born out of white supremacist ideology.27 Blacks and
whites lived in separate worlds under Jim Crow and rarely interacted as
equals.28 What was unique about Richard and Mildred Loving is that they
did not grow up in a segregated community.29 They were raised in Caroline
County, Virginia, a small and rural community that “had so many multiracial
residents of white, black and Native American heritage that during
segregation, their children all attended the county’s all-black high school.”30
Caroline County was described as a place where race relations among whites

20. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 20-54 (1950 & Supp. 1960) (repealed 1968) (“It shall
hereafter be unlawful for any white person in this State to marry any save a white person, or a
person with no other admixture of blood than white and American Indian.”).
21. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-59 (1950) (repealed 1968).
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-54 (emphasis added). An exception was made for white people
who were otherwise pure but had “one-sixteenth or less of the blood of the American Indian.”
Id.
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 1-14 (1950 & Supp. 1964) (repealed 1968).
24. See Trosino, supra note 3, at 102.
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-57 (1950) (repealed 1968).
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-58 (1950) (repealed 1968).
27. See ANDREW L. BARLOW, BETWEEN FEAR AND HOPE: GLOBALIZATION AND RACE IN
THE UNITED STATES 48 (2003) (“Jim Crow consciousness was white supremacist, in which the
assertion of genetic and moral superiority was necessary to bolster an otherwise unclear claim
to racial privilege.”).
28. ANDREW MCNEILL CANADY, WILLIS DUKE WEATHERFORD: RACE, RELIGION, AND
REFORM IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH 75 (2016) (“In large part, the two races lived in separate
worlds, and what little interaction did occur took place as whites employed black servants and
farmworkers.”).
29. Carol Morello, Virginia’s Caroline County, ‘Symbolic of Main Street USA,’ WASH.
POST (Feb. 10, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/virginias-caroline-countysymbolic-of-main-street-usa/2012/01/26/gIQAKH0z2Q_story.html [https://perma.cc/R4LHPAQ8].
30. Id.
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and blacks were generally good.31 Interracial marriage or relation was not
uncommon in this area, and many in the farming community went to bat for
the Lovings.32 Mildred and Richard thus did not grow up in the separate,
isolated worlds common for blacks and whites during that time. Having lived
side by side, the Lovings had a shared experience, which presumably led to
the kind of mutual respect and comfort upon which they built their
relationship.33
III. FEAR OF THE BLACK FAMILY: PREVENTING CHILD ABUSE
The Lovings’ journey to the U.S. Supreme Court began when they left
Caroline County and were married in Washington, D.C.34 Following their
marriage, the couple returned to Caroline County to live and start a family.35
Not long after their return, they were arrested for attempting to evade
Virginia’s prohibition against interracial marriage by leaving the state to
marry and returning there to live as husband and wife.36 The two ultimately
pled guilty and were each sentenced to one year in jail.37 Their sentences
were suspended on the condition that they leave Virginia and not return
together as man and wife for twenty-five years.38 After failed attempts to
reverse their convictions in state court, the Lovings challenged the
constitutionality of Virginia’s antimiscegenation statute as violative of the

31. Simeon Booker, The Couple That Rocked Courts: Lovings’ Fight Brought Supreme
Court Decision Against Miscegenation Laws, EBONY MAG., Sept. 1967, at 79 (“Reporters
dispatched to [Caroline County] found few individuals who would discuss the case. ‘We have
a community of our own,’ explained a prominent Caroline County leader. ‘Our mores apply
only here. We’ve done more integrating than in any other part of the U.S.’”).
32. See id.
33. A New York Times review of a documentary film featuring the Lovings describes their
undeniable connection with one another:
The improbably named Lovings, Mildred and Richard, make a compelling couple,
and not just because she is half-black, half-Native American and he is good ol’ boy
white. In a rich collection of 16-millimeter film, old news clips and still
photographs, the Lovings don’t look like two people caught up in a cause, they seem
like two people caught up in each other.
Alessandra Stanley, Scenes from a Marriage that Segregationists Tried to Break Up, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/14/arts/television/the-loving-storyan-hbo-documentary.html [https://perma.cc/3MK9-9XTH]. The review also references
quotes from interviews with the Lovings, which were featured in the film. In one scene,
Richard Loving describes the experience of growing up in Caroline County: “There’s a few
white, there’s a few colored and we all, as we grew up and as they grew up, we all helped one
another . . . . It was all mixed together, you know, to start with, so we just kept going that
way.” Id.
34. Brief for Appellants, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (No. 395), 1967 WL
113927, at *6–7.
35. Id. at *7.
36. Id. at *6–7; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 20-58 (1950) (repealed 1968) (“If any white
person and colored person shall go out of this State, for the purpose of being married, and with
the intention of returning, and be married out of it, and afterwards return to and reside in it,
cohabiting as man and wife, they shall be punished . . . and the marriage shall be governed by
the same law as if it has been solemnized in this State.”).
37. Brief for Appellants, supra note 34, at *7.
38. Id.
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Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.39
The Lovings’ case made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, where oral
arguments were conducted on April 10, 1967.40 R.D. McIlwaine III, an
Assistant Attorney General for the Commonwealth of Virginia, presented
Virginia’s case.41 The state’s core argument was that the antimiscegenation
statute in question did not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment because it
applied equally to blacks and whites.42 Further, the state argued that the
Court should uphold the antimiscegenation statute because it served a
legitimate state interest in protecting the institution of marriage.43
Assistant Attorney General McIlwaine’s discussion of why the prevention
of interracial marriages was a “legitimate exercise of the state power”44 shed
light on the state’s desire to prevent the dilution of the white race. The
discussion of the state’s purpose began with a sly focus on the challenges that
faced children born of interracial marriages.45 While acknowledging that
there was scientific evidence “on both sides,” Mr. McIlwaine stated: “It is
clear from the most recent available evidence on the psycho-sociological
aspect of this question that intermarried families are subjected to much
greater pressures and problems [than] those of the intramarried . . . .”46
Relying on a dubious “study,”47 McIlwaine then proceeded to place the
state’s interest in prohibiting interracial marriage on equal footing with the
state’s prohibition of polygamous marriage, incestuous marriage, and
marriage between incompetent parents.48 He argued that children born of
interracial marriages “have almost insuperable difficulties in identification
and that the problems which a child of an interracial marriage faces are those
which no child can come through without damage to himself.”49 McIlwaine
derided the parents of children born to interracial unions and stated that
“interracial marriages bequeath to the progeny of those marriages, more
psychological problems than parents have a right to bequeath to them.”50 He
then referred to the children of interracial marriages as “victims.”51
McIlwaine conceded that the problems faced by children of interracial

39. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
40. See generally Oral Argument, supra note 5.
41. Id. at 00:51:28–2:03:37.
42. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1967); see also Oral Argument, supra note 5, at
1:00:05–:00:42.
43. Loving, 388 U.S. at 8; see also Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 1:00:44–:01:12.
44. Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 1:19:08–:19:11.
45. Id. at 1:19:58–:27:19.
46. Id. at 1:19:34–:21:07.
47. McIlwaine principally relied upon a book written by Dr. Albert Isaac Gordon, which
McIlwaine said “is characterized as the definitive book on intermarriage, and has the most
careful, up to date, methodologically sound study of intermarriage in North America that
exists.” Id. at 1:22:08–:22:24. See generally ALBERT I. GORDON, INTERMARRIAGE:
INTERFAITH, INTERRACIAL, INTERETHNIC (1964) (containing information that served as the
bases for Virginia’s arguments in Loving).
48. Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 1:20:51–:21:26.
49. Id. at 1:26:19–:26:40.
50. Id. at 1:23:43–:23:51.
51. Id. at 1:27:03–:27:17.
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marriage were likely due to racism.52 Ultimately, McIlwaine was forced to
acknowledge the primary reason antimiscegenation laws were enacted—to
advance the cause of white supremacy.53
IV. BIAS AND DISPROPORTIONALITY
Vestiges of the white supremacist ideology at the center of Loving appear
in our current child welfare system, which has long been plagued by
disproportionate representation of black families in its charge.54 For nearly
two decades, studies have indicated that black children are overrepresented
in the child welfare system.55 Black children are referred to child protective
authorities, investigated by child protective workers, and placed in foster care
This pattern of
at much higher rates than are white children.56
disproportionate representation has persisted despite efforts by federal, state,
and local government programs to address disproportionality.57
Bias58 and poverty59 may influence such disproportionality. Both of these
factors can be traced back to the broader legacy of legalized racism and
segregation that underpinned antimiscegenation laws.60 Studies on the role
of bias in perpetuating disproportionality conjure up the arguments raised by
Assistant Attorney General McIlwaine in Loving: that black parents—and
by extension, the white parents who create families with them—are
inherently incompetent.61 For example, a recent report on disproportionality
cites two studies in Texas that found “that race, risk, and income all influence
case decision, but even though black families tended to be assessed with
lower risk scores than White families, they were more likely than White
families to have substantiated cases, have their children removed, or be
52. Id. at 1:26:19–:26:40.
53. Id. at 1:34:47–:35:33.
54. See CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 2, at 2; DOROTHY ROBERTS,
SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CHILD WELFARE 6 (2002); Jessica Dixon, The AfricanAmerican Child Welfare Act: A Legal Redress for African-American Disproportionality in
Child Protection Cases, 10 BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 109, 109 (2008).
55. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 2, at 2–5.
56. Id. at 3–4.
57. See Chapin Hall Ctr. for Children at the Univ. of Chi., Understanding Racial and
Ethnic Disparity in Child Welfare and Juvenile Justice, in RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITY AND
DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CHILD WELFARE AND JUVENILE JUSTICE: A COMPENDIUM 9, 20
(2009), https://jeffreybutts.files.wordpress.com/2008/03/cjjr_ch_final1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
4GFL-2S3N].
58. See ROBERTS, supra note 54, at 95 (“We should not ignore, though, the considerable
evidence that race and not poverty alone affects decision making at every step of the child
protection process. Racism in reporting illustrates how racial bias combines with broader
inequities to push disparate numbers of Black children into the system.”); see also John Fluke
et al., Research Synthesis on Child Welfare Disproportionality and Disparities, in DISPARITIES
AND DISPROPORTIONALITY IN CHILD WELFARE: ANALYSIS OF THE RESEARCH 1, 16–18 (2011),
https://www.cssp.org/publications/child-welfare/alliance/Disparities-and-Disproportionalityin-Child-Welfare_An-Analysis-of-the-Research-December-2011.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z6T
Y-SP2Q].
59. See, e.g., CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 2, at 6.
60. Katie Eyer, Constitutional Colorblindness and the Family, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 537,
602–03 (2014).
61. Oral Argument, supra note 5, at 1:23:17–:24:02.
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provided family-based safety services.”62 One of the Texas studies was
particularly compelling. Researchers controlled for multiple variables that
might contribute to disproportionate representation of black children
throughout the child welfare system, including, but not limited to, risk
assessment scores, type of allegation, source of report, and sociodemographic
variables, such as marital status and income.63 Their findings revealed that,
all other things being equal, racial bias was present from the child welfare
system’s very first encounter with a family.64
Research also indicates that racial bias is even more pronounced during
parenting-behavior assessments when such assessments are conducted by
social workers of a different race than the parent.65 Scholars Lawrence
Berger, Marla McDaniel, and Christina Paxson highlight the “systematic
differences” between black and white interviewers and how those
interviewers will assess parenting behaviors and characteristics of black
families.66 For example, when assessed by white observers, black mothers
are more likely to be seen as having a “lack of maternal verbal and social
skills,” being “harsh,” or lacking “warmth” when dealing with their
children’s problem behaviors.67 The study also found, however, that black
mothers are not perceived this way when assessed by a black observer.68
When an observer has incomplete information about a parent, there is
evidence that the observer will use race as a “proxy” for poverty, which may
lead the observer to “attribute poor [parenting skills] to all blacks, regardless
of their socioeconomic status.”69
V. FRONT-END BIAS AND THE LESSONS OF LOVING
An exploding body of research on the nature of bias has shed new light on
twenty-first-century discrimination.70 Unlike the blatant racism that was
62. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 2, at 6 (citing Alan J. Dettlaff et al.,
Disentangling Substantiation: The Influence of Race, Income, and Risk on the Substantiation
Decision in Child Welfare, 33 CHILD. & YOUTH SERVICES REV. 1630, 1630–37 (2011);
Stephanie L. Rivaux et al., The Intersection of Race, Poverty, and Risk: Understanding the
Decision to Provide Services to Clients and to Remove Children, 87 CHILD WELFARE 151, 153
(2008)).
63. Rivaux et al., supra note 62, at 161.
64. See id. (“Race did contribute to the decision to take action on a case; specifically,
when compared to Anglo Americans, African Americans were 20% more likely to have their
case acted upon. Our theoretical variables, risk and income, were also significant
predictors. . . . [A]ll else equal, when actions are taken, Anglo Americans would be more
likely to be assigned to [Family Based Safety Services] while African Americans would be
more likely to be removed.”).
65. See generally Lawrence M. Berger, Marla McDaniel & Christina Paxson, Assessing
Parenting Behaviors Across Racial Groups: Implications for the Child Welfare System, 79
SOC. SERV. REV. 653 (2005) (finding pronounced evidence of racial bias in the assessment of
black parenting behaviors when conducted by white interviewers).
66. Id. at 677.
67. Id. at 674–75.
68. Id. at 674.
69. Id. at 677.
70. See generally Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L. REV.
1124 (2012) (discussing explicit, implicit, and structural forms of bias and their effects on and
within the justice system).
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present during the 1950s when the Lovings were married, researchers have
documented the pervasiveness of implicit and unintentional bias—“attitudes
or stereotypes that affect our understanding, decisionmaking, and behavior,
without our even realizing it.”71 The persistence of disproportionality in the
child welfare system raises the question of whether implicit bias is at play.72
Most of the literature on disproportionality focuses primarily on the extent to
which children of color are removed from their homes, placed in foster care,
and remain in the child welfare system.73 More recently, commentators have
begun to investigate the role of bias in decision-making at the front end of
the system, when claims of child abuse and neglect are initially received and
investigated by child welfare authorities.74 These decisions are critical
because they set the stage for removal of children from their homes and
placement in foster care.
The first decision point in the child welfare journey happens when a parent
is reported for suspected abuse or neglect.75 Depending on the state, reports
of child abuse and neglect are made via telephone or electronically by child
protective agencies or law enforcement agencies.76 These initial reports are
then screened by agency personnel who decide whether the claims meet state
law criteria.77 If the report is deemed valid, it is sent to the local child
protective agency and investigated.78 These investigations open the door for
possible removal and placement in foster care.79 Thus, bias at the front end
of the system provides the gateway to disproportionality.80
Two factors at the front end can lay the groundwork for how implicit bias
might occur. Nationwide, most reports involve claims of child neglect.81
There is already a significant body of scholarship on how the overbroad legal
definitions of child abuse and neglect invite decision makers to supplant the
values of families charged with neglect.82 State definitions of child neglect
are particularly troublesome because they point to conditions of poverty, such
as inadequate food, clothing, or shelter.83 The presence of these seemingly
innocuous measures in evaluating parents’ capabilities belies the history of
71. Id. at 1126.
72. See Rakesh Beniwal, Note, Implicit Bias in Child Welfare: Overcoming Intent, 49
CONN. L. REV. 1021, 1026, 1063–67 (2017).
73. See, e.g., ROBERTS, supra note 54, at vi–x.
74. See Beniwal, supra note 72, at 1027–37; see also Fluke et al., supra note 58, at 16–
18, 22, 64.
75. All fifty states have processes for receiving and investigating complaints regarding
parents who may be abusing or neglecting their children. See, e.g., CHILD WELFARE INFO.
GATEWAY, MAKING AND SCREENING REPORTS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1 (2017),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/repproc.pdf [https://perma.cc/U4PQ-5PV5].
76. Id. at 2.
77. Id. at 3.
78. Id.
79. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
81. See Fluke et al., supra note 58, at 31.
82. See generally Douglas J. Besharov, Child Abuse Realities: Over-Reporting and
Poverty, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 165 (2000) (discussing varying definitions of child abuse
and neglect and how such differentiation affects reporting and decision-making).
83. See id. at 201–03.
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ideological racism inherent within the child welfare system, which is rooted
in legal theories that, historically and intentionally, reinforced the institution
of slavery84 and the inadequacy of black mothers.85 Thus, evaluating
whether parents have provided “adequate” care is inherently fraught. Such
evaluations can easily invite a muted version of the kind of bias that
permeated the antimiscegenation laws at issue in Loving.
Another front-end factor worth considering is the ubiquitous system of
mandatory reporting laws that support the child welfare system.86 All fifty
states “have statutes identifying persons who are required to report suspected
child [abuse and neglect] to an appropriate agency.”87 These mandatory
reporting statutes have built-in incentives that encourage reporters to take
action, even in close cases.88 Definitions of neglect and mandatory reporting
laws are designed to support the child welfare system in protecting children
from harm.89 But what if the faulty definition of “child neglect,” combined
with mandatory reporting laws, create the groundwork for implicit racial
stereotypes to emerge?90
A manual developed by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services’s Office on Child Abuse and Neglect provides a powerful example
of how evaluating whether a parent has neglected her child can invite implicit
bias.91 The manual defines environmental neglect as being “characterized by
a lack of environmental or neighborhood safety, opportunities, or
resources.”92 In addition, the manual encourages case workers to focus most
84. See Rankin, supra note 12, at 5–6 (“At the rise of the 20th century, three legal
principles would govern the child welfare system: the colonial poor laws, the principle of
parens patriae, and the concept of the legal contract. These legal theories would shape the . . .
different approaches on how to intervene in the child-parent-state relationship, but these
principles would not serve as the foundation for America’s relationship to the Black family
structure. Because of ideological racism, there would be a different set of guidelines used for
Black families. The Black experience would begin outside of the three principles guiding
child welfare. The ‘peculiar institution’ of slavery would serve as the first implementation of
child welfare for Black children in the United States, with responsibility and rights legally
stripped from the Black parent.” (footnotes omitted)).
85. See id. at 8–9 (explaining that the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974
established legal principles and guidelines for neglect definitions and reporting procedures
that were based in the nation’s view that the “Black matriarch” was “the root of all Black
families’ ills,” which propelled the removal of black children from their homes and into foster
care).
86. See generally CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT
(2016),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/manda.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5HHR-ZJ84].
87. Id. at 1.
88. For example, mandatory reporters enjoy immunity for false reports made in good faith
and could be subject to criminal liability for failure to report. See id. at 3–4.
89. See id. at 3.
90. See generally Paul M. Herr, Consequences of Priming: Judgment and Behavior, 51
J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1106 (1986) (confirming the widespread research indicating
that an individual’s previous exposure to exemplars or nonexemplars of social categories will
profoundly influence their perception of a subsequent interaction or observation).
91. DIANE DEPANFILIS, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILD NEGLECT: A
GUIDE FOR PREVENTION, ASSESSMENT, AND INTERVENTION 13–14 (2006),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/neglect.pdf [https://perma.cc/3Y3Q-TTLW].
92. Id.
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attention on the “conditions in the home,” “parental omissions,” and “impact
of dangerous neighborhoods,” and to look for signs of risk factors such as
“poverty, community and society characteristics.”93 Consequently, when
caseworkers use federal guidelines such as these to assess a parent accused
of neglect, their expectations are effectively “primed.”94 If a worker has
recently observed or read about parenting behavior that often leads to a
finding of “neglect,” the worker may interpret a subsequent parent’s
behaviors in a way that is consistent with their expectations for finding
neglect.95 Additionally, when examples of “good parenting” are created by
the social expectations of a white-majority middle-class culture, observers
are significantly more likely to evaluate a particular situation under a lens
that favors families who exemplify these expectations.96 In effect, mandatory
reporters and other front-line decision makers called to identify and evaluate
black families suspected of child neglect are primed by these faulty standards
to summon the ghosts of antimiscegenation laws.
The limited data on the experiences of interracial families in the child
welfare system paint an eerie path back to Loving’s troubling legacy. One
study has shown that biracial children in the child welfare system fare worse
than black children.97 They were more likely to be referred for investigations
and considered high risk than white or African American children.98
Moreover, parents of biracial children “were more often assessed as having
physical, intellectual or emotional problems.”99 More data are required to
illuminate whether bias is implicated for biracial children in the child welfare
system, but the data reported100 in this recent study are troubling, to say the
least.
CONCLUSION
The legacy of Loving is far reaching. Richard and Mildred Loving will
always be celebrated for the courage they exhibited and the path they created
toward marriage equality.101 On the flip side, the legacy of white supremacy
disguised as child protection deserves to be interrogated. The pervasiveness
of disproportionality in the modern child welfare system provides fodder for
exploring Loving’s reach.
93. Id. at 14, 29.
94. See generally Herr, supra note 90 (discussing the influence and effects of exposure to
social characteristics and perceptions on expectation).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1114 (“[T]he activated category may serve as a filter through which ongoing
events are screened. Ambiguous . . . events may be perceived consistently with the activated
category. That is, the perceiver should conclude that these events are consistent with her
expectancy . . . .”).
97. Rachel A. Fusco et al., Aren’t They Just Black Kids?: Biracial Children in the Child
Welfare System, 15 J. CHILD & FAM. SOC. WORK 441, 447–49 (2010).
98. Id. at 447.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 444–47.
101. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2599 (2015) (“T[he] abiding
connection between marriage and liberty is why Loving invalidated interracial marriage bans
under the Due Process Clause.” (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967))).

